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On June 6, 1989, seventy agents from the FBI and EPA,
armed with a search warrant, entered the Department of Energy's
Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant in Colorado. Capping a ten-
month criminal investigation, the search exposed evidence of a
wide range of environmental violations, including the secret incin-
eration of hazardous wastes, false claims of compliance with
groundwater monitoring requirements, and intentional mixing of
hazardous and radioactive wastes.1
The Rocky Flats incident is a particularly dramatic but none-
theless accurate reflection of the type of environmental problems
created by federal facilities. By the mid-1970s, the federal govern-
ment had adopted statutes governing almost every major environ-
mental threat, including air emissions, pesticides, and hazardous
waste dumping. As the 1990s commence, one great irony is that the
federal government continues to be a major violator of its own
laws. From the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Maine to the Feed
Materials Production Center in Ohio to the Hanford Reservation
in Washington, almost every state in the country faces pollution
problems caused by the activities of federal facilities. 2 The prob-
t A.B. 1987, Stanford University; J.D. 1990, The University of Chicago.
1 Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1989, Report of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, HR Rep No 101-141, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 4 (1989).
Id at 3-40 (testimony and correspondence to Congress from forty-five states regarding
federal facility environmental problems).
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lem posed by hazardous wastes is particularly acute. The Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE)
generate twenty million tons of hazardous or mixed hazardous and
radioactive waste each year.3 As of April 1989, according to the
EPA, forty-four of eighty-two federal land disposal facilities were
in "significant noncompliance" with the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA).4
RCRA, passed in 1976, established a "cradle-to-grave" scheme
of measures-including permits, monitoring, and recordkeep-
ing-for regulating the generation, transport, treatment, and dis-
posal of solid waste. 5 The federal government has repeatedly
sought less stringent application of these rules to its facilities than
to private industry or state and local governments.' For instance,
the DOE maintained that the Atomic Energy Act precluded appli-
cation of RCRA to its facilities, until a federal district court ruled
otherwise in 1984. The DOE next proposed that RCRA did not
apply to hazardous waste containing "by-product" material, which
would exempt much of the DOE's mixed hazardous and radioac-
tive waste;8 the Department eventually abandoned this position in
May, 1987.9 Federal facilities have also benefited from the Depart-
ment of Justice's position that the EPA does not have enforcement
3 Id at 3.
4 42 USC §§ 6901-6992 (1982 & Supp 1989). Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1989,
S 1140, 135 Cong Rec S6333 (June 7, 1989) (introductory statement by Senator Frank
Lautenberg).
I Note, How Well Can States Enforce Their Environmental Laws When the Polluter
is the United States Government?, 18 Rutgers L J 123, 126-27 (1986).
8 Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies, Hearings on HR 1056 before the
Subcommittee on Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the House Commit-
tee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 16-19 (1989) ("Hearings on Federal
Compliance") (statement of Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General, State of
Washington).
I Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. v Hodel, 586 F Supp 1163 (E D
Tenn 1984).
8 Hearings on Federal Compliance at 16 (cited in note 6).
' Cleanup at Federal Facilities, Hearings on HR 3781, HR 3782, HR 3783, HR 3784,
and HR 3785 before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materi-
als of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 128 n 5 (1988)
("Hearings on Federal Cleanup") (statement of Roger Stanley, Hanford Project Manager for
the Washington State Department of Ecology).
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authority against sister agencies. 10 Today, federal facilities are fo-
cusing on opposing certain enforcement measures in RCRA cases."
The long history of RCRA noncompliance and legal maneuver-
ing has prompted proposal in Congress of the Federal Facilities
Compliance Act of 1989 (FFCA).'2 This series of amendments to
RCRA would clarify that federal facilities are subject to a range of
enforcement measures, whether used by the EPA, states, or citi-
zens, while limiting the personal civil liability of employees and the
criminal liability of the agencies. The Senate version would, in ad-
dition, implement an inspection program. As of June 1990, the
House had already approved the Act, by a vote of 380-39,1 but the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works had not yet
acted.
This Comment focuses on the question of whether, under the
current version of RCRA, states should be able to use civil penal-
ties against the federal government. Section I establishes the tex-
tual basis in RCRA for the availability of civil penalties. Section II
examines the issue from several different policy angles, and con-
cludes that civil penalties can be justified, or at least defended,
from each viewpoint.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the government
from suit without its consent. Accordingly, federal facilities are
subject to environmental laws only to the extent specified by Con-
gress. Most of the current RCRA controversy has centered on
whether § 6961, the federal facilities provision, permits states to
assess civil penalties under state law.'4 Federal district courts in
10 The EPA currently defers to the Department of Justice's position that: (1) the EPA
cannot sue a sister agency because such controversies are not justiciable; and (2) the EPA
cannot issue enforcement orders against a sister agency because the executive branch is
"unitary." Hearings on Federal Cleanup at 180, 186-87 (cited in note 9). The Justice De-
partment's second position is inconsistent with the EPA's own original understanding of its
enforcement powers, id at 187, and both arguments have been challenged by a Congressional
Research Service study. Id at 180-81, 188-90. See also Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue
Other Federal Agencies?, 17 Ecol L Q 317 (1990).
21 Hearings on Federal Compliance at 156 (statement of Daniel Reicher, Natural Re-
sources Defense Council) (cited in note 6).
12 Federal Facilities Compliance Act, HR 1056, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (February 22,
1989), in 135 Cong Rec H327 (February 22, 1989) (for full text, see HR Rep No 101-141 at 2
(cited in note 1)); and S 1140, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (June 7, 1989) in 135 Cong Rec S6333
(June 7, 1989).
13 Vote on HR 1056, 135 Cong Rec H3932 (July 19, 1989).
14 Alternative theories are that the EPA or citizens can seek penalties against federal
facilities. RCRA §§ 6928(a) and (g) permit the EPA to assess civil penalties against any
1990]
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Maine and Ohio have held that § 6961 does waive the federal gov-
ernment's immunity to penalties. 15 As this Comment went to press,
the Sixth Circuit reversed the Ohio district court's ruling on §
6961, but found state penalty authority under a different RCRA
provision (see note 14). The Tenth Circuit also very recently joined
the Ninth Circuit and a North Carolina district court in declining
to permit penalties under § 6961.16
Before examining the language of RCRA, it will be helpful to
place in context the civil penalties involved in these cases. Civil
penalties are, undeniably, remedial measures designed to enforce
environmental duties. They are fines for violating the law, not
compensatory damages. In theory,- they can be administratively as-
sessed or court-ordered; this Comment will focus on the latter.
They are also one of an array of remedial tools, ranging from in-
junctions to administrative orders to criminal sanctions, that fed-
eral enforcers can use under RCRA against private or state and
local government violators. 7 Injunctions and sanctions to enforce
them are explicitly available to state enforcers under §6961; this
Comment contends that the statute also grants states the discre-
tion to use civil penalties.
A. Text of RCRA
Section 6961 states that any federal "department, agency, and
instrumentality" that has "jurisdiction over" or handles solid or
hazardous waste:
"person" who violates the statute, but the definition of "person" in § 6903(15) does not
include the United States, although it does include states and municipalities. Moreover, the
EPA currently defers to the Department of Justice's position that the EPA should not act
against sister agencies. See note 10. Section 6972 authorizes citizen suits against violators.
States have tried to sue for penalties directly under RCRA by claiming citizen status. Al-
though § 6972(a) explicitly includes the United States in its definition of "person," it incor-
porates the penalty provisions of § 6928, which appears not to apply to the United States.
The Sixth Circuit has recently authorized state penalties under § 6972, reasoning that be-
cause § 6972 incorporates § 6928, not vice versa, the definition from § 6972 applies. State of
Ohio v United States Department of Energy, 1990 WL 77227, *7 (6th Cir 1990). But see
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v Weinberger, 655 F Supp 601, 603-04 (E D Cal
1986) (argument rejected); and United States v State of Washington, 872 F2d 874, 880-81
(9th Cir 1989) (issue raised but not decided).
I State of Maine v Department of Navy, 702 F Supp 322 (D Me 1988); and State of
Ohio, 689 F Supp 760.
1" Mitzelfelt v Department of the Air Force, 903 F2d 1293 (10th Cir 1990); State of
Washington, 872 F2d 874; and Meyer v Coast Guard, 644 F Supp 221 (E D NC 1986). See
also McClellan, 655 F Supp 601.
1 RCRA, 42 USC §§ 6928(a) and (g), 6903(15).
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shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, inter-
state, and local requirements, both substantive and proce-
dural (including any requirement for permits or reporting or
any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may
be imposed by a court to enforce such relief), respecting con-
trol and abatement of solid waste or hazardous waste disposal
in the same manner, and to the same extent, as any person is
subject to such requirements, including the payment of rea-
sonable service charges. Neither the United States, nor any
agent, employee, or officer thereof, shall be immune or exempt
from any process or sanction of any State or Federal Court
with respect to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief.18
Since a waiver of sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but
must be unequivocally expressed,"19 one might say that the very
existence of a dispute over the interpretation of the text proves
that Congress has not waived the immunity. However, the waiver
of immunity is equivocal only if one adopts an extremely narrow
and formalistic reading of the statute. A more straightforward
reading of the text shows that Congress intended not to give fed-
eral facilities any special treatment.
When all of the clarifying and descriptive clauses are stripped
away, the central statement of the provision is that federal facili-
ties "shall" be subject to "all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements ... in the same manner, and to the same extent, as
any person is subject to such requirements.. . ." The term "shall,"
according to conventional statutory construction, means that the
prescribed actions are mandatory. The phrase "in the same man-
ner, and to the same extent" as any other polluter makes it clear
that federal facilities should not be exempted in any way. The use
of the word "all" before "requirements" establishes the compre-
hensive scope of the rules and regulations that apply to federal
facilities.
The broad meaning of the term "requirements" is established
by the clauses that follow it. The phrase "both substantive and
procedural" could be read as dividing the world of requirements
into halves-substantive and procedural-or it could be read to il-
lustrate, without limiting, types of requirements. Either way, civil
penalties fall within the scope of the clause. Under the first inter-
's 42 USC § 6961.
19 United States v King, 395 US 1, 4 (1969), quoted in United States v Mitchell, 445
US 535, 538 (1980).
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pretation, civil penalties fall into the category of procedural re-
quirements; they are like injunctions and the accompanying sanc-
tions that appear in the parenthetical clause, which, under this
interpretation, is illustrative of procedural requirements. Under
the second interpretation, the phrase "both substantive and proce-
dural" simply emphasizes that requirements can include more than
just the substance of duties such as monitoring and recordkeeping.
The items in the parenthetical clause suggest other possible types
of requirements without exhausting them, since the clause begins
with the word "including."20 The fact that injunctive relief and ac-
companying sanctions are listed in the clause demonstrates that
enforcement mechanisms can be types of "requirements." Taken
together, these sentences all show that civil penalties fall within
the scope of "requirements." Even the Sixth Circuit, in State of
Ohio, conceded that "[a]n ordinary reading of the phrase
'all . . . requirements' indicates that a civil penalty is a 'require-
ment' because a party violating the statute will be required to pay
the penalty."'21
The next full sentence-which states that neither the United
States, nor any of its agents, employees, or officers, shall be im-
mune from "enforcement of any such injunctive relief"-does not
limit the scope of the requirements made applicable to federal fa-
cilities by the previous sentences. In part, it merely repeats the
waiver of the United States' immunity established by the inclusion
of injunctive relief in the parenthetical clause of the prior sentence.
The sentence adds to the provision by extending the applicability
of injunctive relief to responsible individuals.22
As the district court concluded in State of Maine v Depart-
ment of the Navy, quoting the magistrate,
an intelligent person reading the statute would think the mes-
sage plain: federal facilities will be treated the same as private
institutions so far as enforcement of the solid waste and haz-
ardous waste laws are concerned .... It is hard to imagine
clearer language short of listing every possible variation of
such requirements.23
21 See State of Ohio, 689 F Supp at 765 n 2 (listing other applicable requirements that
are not contained in the parenthetical clause).
21 State of Ohio, 1990 WL 77227, *5.
22 See Captain John H. Kongable, USAF, Civil Penalties Under the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act: Must Federal Facilities Pay?, 31 AF L Rev 21, 29 (1989).
23 State of Maine, 702 F Supp at 326 (quoting Magistrate's Recommended Decision).
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Accordingly, since private and state and local government violators
are subject to civil penalties, federal violators should be too.
The counter-arguments to this common sense reading all focus
on the absence of any specific mention of civil penalties in § 6961.
The interpretive canon of expressio unius-holding that the men-
tion of some items implies the exclusion of others-can arguably
take several different forms to exclude civil penalties from § 6961.
One might rely on the conceptual distinction between duties
and the means used to enforce them to argue that the concept of
requirements simply does not include the latter. If enforcement
mechanisms are not "requirements," then the sweep of the de-
scriptive term "all" is irrelevant, and it would seem plausible that
measures beyond requirements-"non-requirements"-ought to be
specifically listed before a waiver of immunity will be found. An
early Ninth Circuit opinion, California v Walters, appeared to use
this rationale to find no waiver of immunity to criminal sanctions
in § 6961. Holding that criminal sanctions are an enforcement
mechanism and "not a 'requirement' of state law," the court rea-
soned that only "[s]tate waste disposal standards, permits, and re-
porting duties clearly are 'requirements' for the purpose of
§ 6961." It went on to say, "Section 6961 plainly waives... immu-
nity to sanctions imposed to enforce injunctive relief, but this only
makes more conspicuous its failure to waive immunity to criminal
sanctions," apparently assuming that sanctions, precisely because
they are not "requirements," must be specifically listed in order for
immunity to be waived.24
This expressio unius line fails as a way of logically excluding
civil penalties. Whatever the merits of the conceptual distinction
between duties and the means used to enforce them, it is not one
respected in the text of § 6961: the provision's reference to injunc-
tions, and court-ordered sanctions for their violation, bars reading
"requirements" to exclude all enforcement mechanisms. Moreover,
the statute waives immunity only for requirements, not for re-
quirements plus anything else specifically named.
Other variations on the expressio unius argument would con-
cede that enforcement mechanisms can be considered require-
ments conceptually, but would limit the scope of the term for pur-
poses of § 6961 in different ways. One might contend, for instance,
" California v Walters, 751 F2d 977, 978 (9th Cir 1985). See also State of Florida
Department of Environmental Regulation v Silvex Corporation, 606 F Supp 159, 163 (M D
Fla 1985) (holding that state strict liability statutes are not "requirements" within the
meaning of § 6961 because they are not "objective" regulations).
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that any sanction-that is, any penalty-must be specifically listed
if it is to be a "requirement" within the meaning of § 6961. The
most recent Ninth Circuit decision on the issue, State of Washing-
ton v United States, seems to adopt this approach,25 rejecting the
imposition of civil penalties because "the only unequivocal and ex-
press reference to sovereign immunity in section 6961 is directed at
court-ordered sanctions for a violation of an injunction. '2 The
court emphasized the reference to this item in both the parentheti-
cal clause and the sentence waiving the immunity of the federal
agents and employees. The North Carolina district court appar-
ently used the same logic in Meyer v Coast Guard, holding that
"[a] strict construction of the statute should limit the waiver to
those penalties specifically mentioned. '27
However, the text provides no support for the reading that
sanctions-but no other requirements-must be specifically named
in order to fall within the scope of the statute. The textual basis
for treating sanctions differently from all other enforcement mech-
anisms seems particularly weak. In both the parenthetical clause
and the sentence waiving employee immunity, court-ordered sanc-
tions are listed in tandem with the injunctive relief that they are
supposed to back up. Listing items together usually suggests that
they are to be treated similarly, not that one is to be subject to a
stricter standard of review for immunity waivers.
One could also try to draw a line between enforcement re-
quirements and other requirements and claim that the former
must be explicitly mentioned in order for the waiver to be applica-
ble. The parenthetical clause could provide some basis for the ar-
gument, since by listing some enforcement mechanisms it might
appear to set that category of requirements apart as one for which
immunity is only selectively waived. The first response to this ar-
gument, assuming that the parenthetical does indeed only refer to
enforcement mechanisms, is that the clause does not operate as an
exclusive list. It begins with the word "including," which ordinarily
means that the items following are illustrative, not exhaustive.
The second response is that the parenthetical clause does not
necessarily define only enforcement measures. If it does not, there
25 State of Washington, 872 F2d at 877. The Ninth Circuit does quote both proposi-
tions from Walters, without addressing the apparent difference in approach, but it does so
only in the section rejecting an argument to overrule Walters. Id at 879.
26 Id at 877 (emphasis in original).
644 F Supp 221, 222 (E D NC 1986). See also McClellan, 655 F Supp at 603 ("Con-
gress intended to waive sovereign immunity... insofar as process or sanctions is concerned,
only as required for the enforcement of injunctive relief.").
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is little textual basis for applying the expressio unius maxim only
to some types of items mentioned in it. Drawing conceptual lines
between the items mentioned within the parenthetical inevitably
becomes a hairsplitting and rather arbitrary endeavor. The Ninth
Circuit's decision in Parola v Weinberger demonstrates how this
problem can arise. The Parola court held that imposing an exclu-
sive garbage collection system was a requirement that did not need
to be specifically mentioned in the statute. The Ninth Circuit at-
tempted to distinguish Walters by arguing that states have unlim-
ited power to "implement" but not to "enforce" environmental
standards. It stated that "[p]ermits and reporting duties are means
of implementing environmental standards, and are clearly state
'requirements.' An exclusive garbage collection system is more like
a permit requirement than a criminal sanction. 2 8 Using this dis-
tinction would mean, however, that implementation mechanisms
do not need to be specifically mentioned, while enforcement mech-
anisms do. Although the Tenth Circuit in Mitzelfelt v Department
of the Air Force, also concluded that "requirements" can "reasona-
bly be interpreted as including substantive standards and the
means for implementing those standards, but excluding punitive
measures," the court did not provide any supporting textual
analysis.2 9
The remaining alternative constructions would only lead to
absurd results. One could suggest that the parenthetical clause
constitutes an exhaustive list of all the procedural requirements
available-since the clause follows the word "procedural"-or that
the parenthetical clause exhausts all the requirements to which
federal facilities can be subject. Either reading would exempt fed-
eral facilities from a range of monitoring, inspection, and other as-
pects of RCRA's cradle-to-grave approach not spelled out in the
provision. Clearly, as the district court in State of Maine noted, "it
would be nonsensical to require Congress to make a detailed
punchlist of all of the 'requirements' set out in the entire body of
environmental law of the federal government and each of the fifty
states."30
One final place where a line could be drawn in the text is at
the sentence waiving the immunity of the United States and its
agents. Since it is the only sentence that uses the words "immu-
nity" and "waiver," it arguably defines all the items to which im-
28 Parole, 848 F2d at 962 n 3.
"' Mitzelfelt, 903 F2d 1293. See also State of Ohio, 1990 WL 77227, *6.
SO 702 F Supp at 327. See also State of Ohio, 689 F Supp at 765 n 2.
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munity has been waived. However, such an argument proves too
much;31 it would undermine the waiver established by the previous
sentences for a whole host of substantive and procedural regula-
tions. As noted earlier, moreover, this sentence serves primarily to
extend the waiver to government officials.
In sum, although the definition of "requirements" could be
limited to exclude or at least to limit the availability of enforce-
ment mechanisms, such a reading can be achieved only by import-
ing an intent to limit into the language of the provision. The more
natural reading of the term is a broadly inclusive one. As the State
of Maine court noted, "[b]y the language, Congress gave a clear
and explicit waiver of immunity to a generic category of 'require-
ments' broad enough to include, by any fair construction, civil pen-
alties;" the definition of a requirement as "'something called for or
demanded'" encompasses civil penalties, which are "'called for'"
to enforce state environmental laws.32
B. Historical Circumstances
The historical context of RCRA's passage strongly suggests
that Congress intended the term "requirements" to permit the use
of civil penalties by states, and to encompass more than merely the
items listed, whatever the type of requirement. The legislative his-
tory discounts the validity of a narrow reading of the term, and the
post-enactment history, despite some tantalizing clues, cannot be
relied upon to prove otherwise.
1. Pre-RCRA history.
RCRA was passed three months after the Supreme Court's
companion decisions in Hancock v Train and EPA v State Water
Resources Control Board. In Hancock, the Supreme Court held
that state permits were not "requirements" compulsory upon fed-
eral facilities under the Clean Air Act (CAA).33 At the time, § 118
of the CAA stated that federal facilities "shall comply with Fed-
eral, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting control
and abatement of air pollution to the same extent that any person
is subject to such requirements. ' 34 The Court emphasized first that
SI State of Maine, 702 F Supp at 338 n 7; and State of Ohio, 689 F Supp at 765 n 3.
3' State of Maine, 702 F Supp at 326-27, citing Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1929 (Merriam-Webster, 1981).
33 426 US 167, 198 (1976).
CAA, 42 USC § 1857(f) (1970).
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the provision did not require compliance with "all" requirements.3 5
It then went on to characterize permit systems as enforcement
mechanisms,3 6 concluding that they were not substantive require-
ments and hence fell outside the scope of the statute. The Court
stated:
[W]e find in the 1970 Amendments several firm indications
that the Congress intended to treat emission standards and
compliance schedules-those requirements which when met
work the actual reduction of air pollutant dis-
charge-differently from administrative and enforcement
methods and devices-those provisions by which the States
were to establish and enforce emission standards, compliance
schedules, and the like. 7
Although this statement might suggest that the Court viewed en-
forcement methods as distinct from procedural (i.e., administra-
tive) requirements, this seems unlikely because the Court quoted
with approval the Court of Appeals, which had "concluded that
federal installations were obligated to comply with state substan-
tive requirements, as opposed to state procedural require-
ments . . ... 8 The Court used the same reasoning in EPA v
State Water Resources Control Board to determine that § 505 of
the Clean Water Act (CWA), which was virtually identical to § 118
of the CAA, did not require federal facilities to obtain discharge
permits.39
A comparison between the language of RCRA and the CWA
and CAA provisions at issue in Hancock and Water Resources in-
dicates that Congress intended "requirements" to have a broader
meaning in § 6961. Most importantly, Congress inserted the word
"all" before requirements in the RCRA. This responded directly to
a justification the Supreme Court used for its narrow interpreta-
tions of the CAA and CWA, and so explicitly broadened the scope
of "requirements." Any variation of the expressio unius argument
" Hancock, 426 US at 182.
3' The Court framed the central question of the case as "whether Congress intended
that the enforcement mechanisms of federally approved state implementation plans, in this
case permit systems, would be available to the States to enforce that duty." Id at 183 (cita-
tion omitted).
37 Id at 185-86.
38 Id at 183.
31 EPA v State Water Resources Control Board, 426 US 200, 211-15, 227-28 (1976);
Clean Water Act, 33 USC § 1323 (1970, Supp IV).
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that reads portions of the provision as exclusive is simply inconsis-
tent with the expansive intent Congress demonstrated.
Congress also added the phrase "both substantive and proce-
dural" after "requirements." Again, this responded to Hancock
and Water Resources, which Congress regarded as having turned
in part on the Court's finding that "Congress intended to treat
substantive state requirements different from procedural require-
ments. 40 Congress appeared to classify enforcement mechanisms
as procedural requirements, since it listed permit systems, which
the Court had characterized as enforcement mechanisms, as an ex-
ample of procedural requirements. Even if enforcement sanctions
such as civil penalties were not intended to be procedural require-
ments, the addition of the word "procedural" at least denies the
narrow view of "requirements" as encompassing only substantive
duties. As the court in State of Maine noted, "in reaction to the
[Hancock] decision, Congress enacted language clearly intended to
obviate the effect of the distinction highlighted in the [Hancock]
opinion upon an effective comprehensive waiver of sovereign
immunity.""'
2. RCRA legislative history.
The hearings and floor debates do not cast any direct light on
the specific issue of whether Congress meant to waive federal facil-
ities' immunity to civil penalties.42 The committee hearings did not
include any explicit discussion of applying civil penalties to the
federal government. To the extent that civil penalties were dis-
cussed at all, witnesses advocated them as a necessary and impor-
tant enforcement tool.43 The always difficult task of ascertaining
congressional intent from the legislative record is complicated by
the fact that the House and Senate proposed very different federal
facility provisions, but did not issue a conference report. The Sen-
ate passed its version of RCRA on June 30, 1976. 44 The House de-
40 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Report of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, HR Rep No 94-1491, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 45 (1976).
41 702 F Supp at 327. See also State of Ohio, 1990 WL 77227, *5
42 See Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance with the RCRA and Other Envi-
ronmental Statutes: An Administrative Proposal, 28 Wm & Mary L Rev 513, 532-36 (1987);
and Kongable, 31 AF L Rev at 30-33 (cited in note 21). For a general discussion of the
pitfalls of relying on legislative history, see Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Reg-
ulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 429-34 (1989).
"s HR Rep No 94-1491 at 83-84 (letter from Peter R. Taft, Assistant Attorney General,
Land and Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice) (cited in note 39).
"" Vote on S 3622, 122 Cong Rec S21429 (June 30, 1976).
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bated its committee's version on September 27, and agreed to ac-
cept, wholesale and with minimal discussion, the Senate's language
for the federal facilities provision."
Since the Senate version was the one actually passed, the Sen-
ate record is a logical starting point for analysis of the legislative
history, at least to the extent one can assume that the House
adopted the Senate's intent in passing the Senate version. The
Senate Committee on Public Works explained in its report that
the federal facilities section requires federal agencies to comply "as
if they were private citizens" and demonstrated its awareness of
Hancock by specifically mentioning permit systems.46 Although
these comments do not indicate the Senate's views on civil penal-
ties particularly, they do evince a general intention to treat federal
facilities like other polluters.
The legislative history of the House provision reveals that
some controversy did exist over the extent to which federal facili-
ties should be subject to state environmental regulation. 47 The fi-
nal House version subjected federal facilities only to federally-de-
fined standards, and vested all enforcement authority, including
the power to assess civil penalties up to $25,000 a day, in the
EPA.48 The courts in Mitzelfelt and Meyer concluded that since
the House version of § 6961 specifically mentioned civil penalties,
and the final version did not, Congress, by negative inference, must
have intended to exclude the use of civil penalties.49 This argu-
ment, however, ignores the context in which the change occurred.
The Senate version replaced the House proposal entirely. Since
civil penalties were not specifically stricken from the provision, the
final version's failure to mention them does not prove that Con-
gress intended to exclude them from the scope of the statute.
The Meyer court missed a more subtle but equally speculative
argument based on the failed House proposal. The House version
included civil penalties only as part of an EPA enforcement
scheme; the final version left potential enforcement to the EPA,
states, and citizens. Arguably, House members who did not want to
give any enforcement powers to the states would not permit states
to assess civil penalties, since the latter is merely one type of en-
forcement power. While it is tempting to conjecture that the House
"I Vote on HR 14496, as amended, 122 Cong Rec H32631-32 (Sept 27, 1976).
4' Solid Waste Utilization Act of 1976, S Rep No 94-988, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 23 (1976).
47 HR Rep No 94-1491 at 45 (cited in note 39).
4' Id at 66-67.
4' Mitzelfelt, 903 F2d 1293; Meyer, 644 F Supp at 223.
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agreed to allow non-federal enforcement only on the condition that
remedies would be severely restricted (e.g., civil penalties would
not be available), the legislative record provides no evidence of
such a bargain. The House acceded to the Senate version in its
entirety, without discussing concessions that would make its ap-
proach acceptable to all of the House members. The more plausi-
ble explanation is that the Senate federal facilities provision was
accepted as one piece of an overall political compromise to get the
bill passed; the federal facilities provision was one of about ten
items that the House adopted from the Senate version without
debate.5
The Ninth Circuit in State of Washington made a different
use of the legislative history to reject the use of civil penalties on
federal facilities. Since the legislative history contained no explicit
discussion of state-imposed civil penalties, the court concluded
that the waiver of sovereign immunity was not "express and une-
quivocal."51 This approach leads, once again, to the absurd ex-
treme that any standard or requirement not specifically listed in a
statute or discussed in Congress cannot be applied to federal
facilities.
3. Post-enactment history.
Some have used events after RCRA's passage to argue that
Congress did not intend to waive federal facilities' immunity to
civil penalties.52 In 1977, Congress amended the CAA, subjecting
the federal government to "all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions
. . . to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity." The
amended provision also states that the "subsection shall apply not-
withstanding any immunity of such agencies.... .,"" The accompa-
nying House Report declared "The new section ... is intended to
overturn the Hancock case and to express, with sufficient clarity,
the committee's desire to subject Federal facilities to all Federal,
State, and local requirements-procedural, substantive, or other-
wise-process and sanctions.' 54 That same year the CWA was
"0 Debate on HR 14496, 122 Cong Rec H32599, H32632 (Sept 27, 1976).
52 State of Washington, 872 F2d at 879.
52 See State of Ohio, 1990 WL 77227, *5; Mitzelfelt, 903 F2d 1293; Kongable, 31 AF L
Rev at 33-36 (cited in note 22).
63 CAA, 42 USC § 7418(a) (1982).




amended with identical language except for the qualification that
"the United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties aris-
ing under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to en-
force an order or the process of such court.
55
RCRA's language may appear narrower in scope than these
amended acts, since § 6961 does not explicitly subject federal facil-
ities to all "administrative authority, and process and sanctions" in
addition to "requirements." However, inferring a narrow intent in
RCRA's federal facilities provision from a later Congress's treat-
ment of different statutes is a purely speculative endeavor e.5 An
equally plausible explanation of the differences in wording would
be that RCRA was adopted only a few months after Hancock was
decided, and Congress had not yet found the best way to phrase a
comprehensive waiver of immunity.51 Similarly, the special limita-
tion on civil penalties in the CWA can be interpreted different
ways. It could suggest that Congress intended different remedies to
be available in different environmental areas. Alternatively, the
qualification could simply indicate that the general language of the
provision allows civil penalties, and that Congress knew how to re-
strict their imposition when it wanted to.
Together, the text and history of § 6961 provide the basis for
concluding that the provision permits states to assess civil penal-
ties against federal facilities under state law. The language subjects
federal facilities to all requirements, whether substantive or proce-
dural, applicable to other solid waste generators. It also provides
an illustrative list of such requirements that includes enforcement
mechanisms such as sanctions. Federal facilities must obey RCRA
"in the same manner, and to the same extent," as any other opera-
tion producing solid waste. The circumstances surrounding
RCRA's passage make the significance of the language even
clearer. The words "all" and "substantive and procedural" were
chosen in direct response to the Supreme Court's view that the
term "requirements" in other environmental statutes did not en-
compass enforcement tools. Although an expressio unius argument
could be made to exclude civil penalties, the whole thrust of
CWA, 33 USC § 1323(a) (1982).
M Even floor debates by later Congresses on a particular statute are not proof of prior
intent with respect to that statute. State of Maine, 702 F Supp at 335 n 4, citing United
States v Southwestern Cable Co., 392 US 157, 170 (1968).
67 State of Maine, 702 F Supp at 327-30, 335-38.
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RCRA's language and history run counter to an exclusionary canon
of construction.
II. POLICY ANALYSIS
The textual interpretation that allows states to assess civil
penalties is consistent with a range of policy objectives and con-
straints that Congress faces when it chooses to waive the federal
government's sovereign immunity. The reasonableness of the out-
come from a policy perspective enhances the persuasiveness of the
interpretation. In addition, as long as courts continue to reach dif-
ferent interpretations of § 6961, these policy arguments also sup-
port the passage of an amendment such as the FFCA that would
clarify § 6961's intent to waive the federal government's immunity
to civil penalties.
Waivers of federal sovereign immunity have become increas-
ingly common in the past century, often prompted by realizations
of the growing scope of government wrongs.5 8 Both the Tucker Act,
which waived immunity to contract claims in 1887, and the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), in 1946, were precipitated by the inade-
quacy of private bills in dealing with claims against the govern-
ment; the Congresses of the 1940s, for instance, were considering
over 2000 private petitions for tort compensation each year. 9 In
1976, the Administrative Procedure Act incorporated a waiver of
immunity for administrative wrongs in response to the rapid
growth of the regulatory state. ° While an occasional government
violation might be a tolerable quid pro quo for a government able
to operate without interference, such a tradeoff must be reexam-
ined when the government becomes capable of inflicting wide-
spread harm on society. The scope and intractability of federal fa-
cility RCRA noncompliance make the issue of civil penalties a
pressing one.
" Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 39 (Yale,
1983).
51 Leon Hurwitz, The State as Defendant: Governmental Accountability and the Re-
dress of Individual Grievances 21-22 (Greenwood Press, 1981). Tucker Act, 24 Stat 505
(1887); Federal Tort Claims Act, c 753, 60 Stat 812, Title IV (1946).
0 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 702 (1988). For discussions of the need for
judicial review of administrative action, see Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of
Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity,
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 Mich L Rev 387, 418-28 (1970);
and Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administra-




In the environmental context, the primary values involved in
evaluating a waiver are political legitimacy, environmental goals,
balance of powers, and federal missions. The following sections will
demonstrate that the imposition of civil penalties will further the
first two goals without undermining the latter two. One thought to
keep in mind is that immunity is already indisputably waived for
substantive standards and injunctive relief, so a certain trade-off
between the values has already been agreed upon. Therefore, a
waiver for civil penalties should be acceptable as long as the argu-
ments for and against it are at least as strong and weak, respec-
tively, for remedies compared to standards, and for civil penalties
compared to injunctions.
A. Political Legitimacy
The common law rationale for sovereign immunity originated
with the English notion that the "king can do no wrong." 61 Since
the king ruled by the grace of God (rex gratia dei), any complaint
against the state would amount to a complaint against God. 2 Al-
lowing suits against the sovereign without consent would challenge
its supremacy and tarnish its image. The logic of this rationale be-
gan to lose force, however, as the notion of rex gratia populi (king
by grace of the people) became ascendant.6 3 Government in the
United States, which has always been based on the sovereignty of
the people, seems an especially dubious heir to this rationale for
sovereign immunity. Concern with maintaining political legitimacy,
which once favored immunizing the sovereign, now suggests exactly
the opposite: when the government receives its power from the
people, it maintains credibility by subjecting itself to the laws to
the same extent as they are applied to the people.6 4
A federal facility that violates environmental laws causes the
same environmental problems as any other waste generator, justi-
fying equal application of the laws, including remedies. Hazardous
wastes remain hazardous whether they come from federal facilities
' Schuck, Suing Government at 30 (cited in note 57). Some controversy exists over
whether this maxim really meant that the king could not be sued because he was incapable
of doing wrong, or whether in fact it meant that he was not allowed to do wrong. See Note,
Suit Against the Sovereign: The Dubiety of the Eleventh Amendment, 90 W Va L Rev 211,
214 (1987). The existence of petitions of right and the availability of equitable relief through
the Court of Exchequer seem to indicate that the king was not only capable of doing wrong,
but also could be held responsible. See Schuck, Suing Government at 32-33.
" Hurwitz, The State as Defendant at 10 (cited in note 58).
63 Id at 15-18.
Id at xi-xii; Schuck, Suing Government at 1 (cited in note 57).
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or from private or state or local government operations. In the con-
text of environmental regulation, a facility's status as an operator
that generates waste should be as important as its status as a gov-
ernmental entity.
The state-as-market-participant doctrine provides a useful
analogy for determining how to treat government entities that are
acting as participants in, rather than regulators of, societal activi-
ties. Under this doctrine, states are not subject to Commerce
Clause restrictions on their activities when behaving as actors in
the marketplace." The underlying principle is that when govern-
ment acts as a market participant, it should be treated like one;
this principle arguably suggests not only that government should
be free from ordinary restrictions on its actions as government, but
also that it should be subject to regulations imposed on other mar-
ket participants.
Federal facilities such as naval shipyards or nuclear materials
production plants clearly are not acting as government regulatory
bodies. However, because some of the largest federal facilities pro-
duce "public goods," such as national defense, they may not seem
like ordinary market participants; they seem instead to be fulfilling
a governmental function. Nevertheless, the facilities are acting as
producers, even if they have a monopoly on the particular market;
the value of equal treatment in enhancing political legitimacy
should not be confused with concern about the effect on important
public functions, which will be addressed below in Section II D. In
addition, not all federal facilities perform services that can only be
provided by the government. A government-run nuclear plant, for
instance, produces energy, and waste, the same way that a pri-
vately-owned one does.
Congress has already recognized the political importance of
treating federal facilities like other polluters by setting the same
standards for federal facilities as for private operations. Mandating
compliance with environmental standards is meaningless, however,
if no effective remedy for violations exists. RCRA § 6928 clearly
permits the use of civil penalties against private, state, and local
government operations. Treating federal entities, the other chief
violators of the law, similarly under the statute would enhance the
federal government's credibility as an environmental enforcer.
65 White v Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 US 204, 208




The ultimate goal of civil penalties is to protect the environ-
ment by deterring violations of the environmental laws. The need
for effective remedies to achieve this goal should be self-evident.
The harder question is whether civil penalties serve this purpose
better than, or at least provide a useful alternative to, existing
remedies such as injunctions.
The threat of injunctions has thus far not effectively deterred
federal facilities' violations of RCRA. Despite the undisputed
availability of injunctions and court-ordered sanctions to enforce
them, federal facilities have a long record of noncompliance. Re-
ports of "foot-dragging" 66 and "extreme indifference"6 7 by "recalci-
trant"68 federal facilities were a familiar refrain at the 1989 hear-
ings before Congress on the Federal Facilities Compliance Act.
Kentucky's experiences provide some typical examples. At Fort
Knox, solvents, pesticides, and waste fuels have been improperly
stored in leaking underground tanks, landfills, and lagoons. From
1982 to 1985, the Army "ignored repeated requests to submit an
interim status closure plan and was consistently late in submitting
its generator annual reports."6 " PCBs and radioactive elements
have been detected in fish, surface water, and groundwater near
the Paducah Gaseous Defusion Plant, which produces enriched
uranium for reactor fuel use. Nevertheless, the Department of En-
ergy has refused to grant security clearance for state waste man-
agement inspectors.7 0 Not all federal facilities have been com-
pletely intractable, 71 and recently some have signed comprehensive
compliance agreements. 2 Strong enforcement options remain a ne-
cessity, however, both to preserve incentives for federal facilities to
enter into environmentally rigorous agreements, and to make those
agreements "worth the paper [they are] written on.""3
" Hearings on Federal Compliance at 56 (statement of Thomas C. Jorling, Commis-
sioner, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation) (cited in note 6).
6 Id at 72 (statement by Russell Barnett, Deputy Commissioner, Kentucky Depart-
ment for Environmental Protection).
68 Id at 26 (statement by Jim Jones, Attorney General, Idaho).
49 Id at 73.
70 Id. See also id at 10 (Nevada); 16-17 (Washington); 27 (Idaho); 56 (New York); 65
(Pennsylvania); and 68 (North Carolina).
71 New York, for instance, reports that many of the violations found are corrected on
schedule. Id at 56.
7" For example, the state of Washington, DOE, and EPA have recently proposed a com-
prehensive agreement to bring the Hanford Reservation into RCRA compliance. Id at 21
(statement by Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General, State of Washington).
73 Id.
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The reasons for the ineffectiveness of injunctive remedies to
date are not entirely clear. A key difference between injunctions
and civil penalties, however, is that the former only present a
threat that a court will someday, after lengthy proceedings, tell a
facility to stop violating the law. Civil penalties, on the other hand,
accrue as violations occur, giving facilities an incentive for immedi-
ate compliance, even though penalties will not actually be assessed
until a court proceeding is completed. 74 For instance, if a facility is
charged with having leaking storage tanks in 1990, it can continue
its practice with impunity until a court issues an injunction, per-
haps several years later. If, however, civil penalties are available,
the agency knows that it will be held liable for all violations after
1990.
Because federal facilities are publicly-funded nonprofit enter-
prises, monetary penalties may not be completely effective deter-
rents. For example, penalties may not eliminate "capacity-based
illegality" 11-violations resulting from insufficient appropriations
by Congress. However, budgetary constraints can be an obstacle to
the effectiveness of injunctions as well. More importantly, in the
context of most RCRA violations, budget constraints should not be
insurmountable. 76 Since RCRA focuses on "housekeeping" meas-
ures,77 the most common types of violations are failures to analyze
wastes, obtain permits, properly store wastes, keep records, train
personnel, and develop contingency plans.78 Therefore, compliance,
although not costless, is not expensive, especially compared to
clean-up. Furthermore, subjecting federal facilities to civil penal-
ties should help to eliminate the capacity problem by forcing Con-
gress and the agencies to give priority to compliance funding.
Penalties have one potential problem that injunctions do not:
the use of monetary penalties may seem futile and illogical when
the payments will ultimately come from the public treasury. In
contrast to private entities, federal facilities do not have profit mo-
7 Confirmed in author's telephone conversations with Dennis Harnish, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Maine, and Jack Van Clay, Assistant Attorney General, Ohio (April 20, 1990).
75 Schuck, Suing Government at 6-8 (cited in note 57).
78 See Donald W. Stever, Perspectives on the Problem of Federal Facility Liability for
Environmental Contamination, 17 Envir L Rptr 10114, 10115-16 (1987), for a discussion of
ways in which agencies can meet fiscal constraints.
7 Phone conversation with Harnish, Maine Assistant Attorney General (cited in note
74).
71 See, for example, State of Washington, 872 F2d at 876; Meyer, 644 F Supp at 222;
and State of Ohio, 689 F Supp at 761. Confirmed in author's conversations with Van Clay,




tives that require internalizing the cost of penalties.7 9 Although the
current RCRA does not specify the source of payment for the civil
penalties, the approach currently used in the CAA (guided by a
1979 Comptroller General opinion and cited with approval by the
House report on the proposed FFCA) requires that a federal
agency conceding liability pay the penalty out of its operating
funds.8 0 If the agency disputes liability, the payment comes from
the "judgment fund" appropriation under 31 USC § 1304, rather
than agency funds."' Unfortunately, this method allows federal
agencies literally to pass the buck for environmental compliance
along to the judgment fund. It also discourages the concession of
liability, hampering environmental enforcement. However, civil
penalties can be structured to make them effective deterrents in
the federal facilities context. Federal agencies may not have to
turn profits, but they do "compete" with other agencies for funds,
which they certainly seek to maximize.8 2 If culpable agencies are
directly charged for their violations, disputed or not, they should
react to the penalties. 8
In the absence of thorough empirical studies, the best evidence
of the effectiveness of civil penalties against publicly-funded
organizations is their widespread use against state and local gov-
ernments and the apparently better compliance records of these
actors.8 Ironically, the federal government vigorously exercises the
remedy from which it wishes to shield itself: between 1983 and
1988, approximately ninety percent of the civil environmental suits
filed by the federal government against state and local govern-
ments sought civil penalties. State and local agencies in every state
except Delaware have been subject to penalties, ranging from $1 to
$1,000,000.85 State and local governments are also subject to penal-
ties under state environmental laws.
70 Schuck, Suing Government at 107 (cited in note 57).
80 HR Rep No 101-141 at 41-42 (cited in note 1).
81 Id. Title 31 is the Money and Finance statute; § 1304 provides a standing appropria-
tion for money to pay judgment awards against the United States.
81 Hearings on Federal Compliance at 34 (statement of Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attor-
ney General, Washington) (cited in note 6).
" Schuck, Suing Government at 107-08 (cited in note 57).
Comprehensive data on state and local government compliance simply is not availa-
ble. At best, their better compliance record relative to federal facilities can be inferred from
the general absence of complaints. As Jim Jones, Attorney General of Idaho states, "Fre-
quently, States have more difficulty obtaining Federal agency compliance with hazardous
waste management programs than resolving similar issues with private parties [or] State or
local governmental entities." Hearings on Federal Compliance at 26 (cited in note 6).
85 Hearings on Federal Cleanup at 218-28 (cited in note 9).
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C. Separation of Powers
1. Executive versus judicial power.
Suits against federal facilities, whether to impose standards or
remedies, implicate the seperation of powers between the executive
and judicial branches. A fear of "undue judicial interference" with
executive functions often underlies debates about sovereign immu-
nity.86 In 1882, Justice Gray, dissenting in United States v Lee,
complained of the executive being "dispossessed by judicial pro-
cess." 87 More recently, the Supreme Court stated in Larson v Do-
mestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. that the "interference of the
Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the execu-
tive departments of the government, would be productive of noth-
ing but mischief."88
According to the theory of checks and balances, however, the
executive should neither be subordinate to the judiciary nor en-
tirely free of constraints. Allowing civil penalties for violations of
the RCRA need not tip the balance of power excessively; because
the RCRA already states that federal facilities must comply with
environmental regulations, giving the courts the power to remedy
violations only gives them the authority to enforce rules to which
the executive is already subject.
In addition, civil penalties will not affect the seperation of
powers any more than injunctive relief already does, since penal-
ties require less judicial intrusion. Injunctive remedies depend on
close judicial examination of specific factual situations, and judicial
determination of particular agency actions.8 9 Penalties also give
courts influence over agency behavior, but let the agencies make
specific decisions based on their own internal calculus. In this re-
spect, the use of civil penalties rather than injunctive relief accords
the federal government more control over the execution of its pol-
icy, not less.
2. Federal versus state power.
Permitting state governments to assess penalties against fed-
eral facilities implicates another separation of powers issue, a fed-
eralism concern with both a structural and a practical component.
s Cramton, 68 Mich L Rev at 397 (cited in note 59).
87 106 US 196, 226 (1882) (Gray dissenting).
88 337 US 682, 704 (1949), quoting Decatur v Paulding, 39 US (14 Peters) 497, 516
(1840).
81 Schuck, Suing Government at 15-16 (cited in note 57).
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Our structure of government demands a certain allocation of power
between federal and state government. Giving states the power to
penalize federal facilities arguably misallocates that power, but the
context in which it would be given suggests otherwise. Much of the
nation's environmental legislation relies on state implementation,
on the theory that state governments are better situated to address
local problems 0 The federal facilities provisions, moreover, al-
ready give state governments the underlying power to establish en-
vironmental standards to which the federal government may be
held accountable; putting enforcement power in the states' hands
gives them nothing more than the ability to make those standards
meaningful. Furthermore, to the extent that civil penalties inter-
fere less directly with agency action, as discussed above, they give
states no more disruptive power than injunctions.
A specific structural concern is that the penalty power may
give states too much control over federal funds.91 However, several
built-in safeguards limit potential abuse. First, states have little
incentive to seek unjustified penalties. State attorneys general re-
cently testified before the House of Representatives that their fo-
cus is on obtaining compliance, not collecting penalties;92 although
such statements may be self-serving, it seems logical that states
would undermine their own effectiveness and credibility as enforc-
ers if their penalties were not carefully tailored. 3 Second, penalty
amounts are usually calculated according to formulas tied closely
to violations. 4 Third, the federal government can always challenge
penalties in court,95 and when the federal government is the de-
fendant the forum will be federal court, where the facility presum-
ably will be protected from egregious state attempts at self-deal-
ing. Fourth, some states require that penalties be paid into
90 Hearings on Federal Compliance at 26 (statement of Jim Jones, Attorney General,
Idaho) (cited in note 6). See also Note, 28 Wm & Mary L Rev at 513 (cited in note 41).
91 Hearings on Federal Compliance at 95 (statement of William H. Parker I, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Environment, that penalties would have "the unfor-
tunate side effect of siphoning funds.") (cited in note 6). The fear is that states will use their
penalty power to "raid" the federal treasury. See also statements by Kenneth 0.
Eikenberry, Attorney General, Washington, id at 20; Representative Dan Schaefer, Colo-
rado, id at 36; Jim Jones, Attorney General, Idaho, id at 37; and Representative Dennis
Eckart, Ohio, id at 74.
'2 See generally HR Rep No 101-141 at 6-39 (cited in note 1).
'3 See Hearings on Federal Compliance at 74 (statements by Thomas C. Jorling, Com-
missioner, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, and Arthur A. Da-
vis, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources) (cited in note 6).
" Id at 75 (statements by Richard L. Shank, Director, Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency, and Thaddeus B. Wester, Deputy Health Director, North Carolina).
95 Id.
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environmental response funds, removing any incentive for states to
use environmental penalties to acquire funds for unrelated state
programs.96 Finally, the best data available suggest that states
have not abused the civil penalty provisions under the CAA, CWA,
or RCRA9 7 The highest total amount sought by a state against a
federal facility for RCRA violations was $125,000, and this was
against the DOE's notoriously noncompliant facility in Ohio. 9
Other penalties have ranged from $61 to $92,000. The average
amount sought was less than $23,000, and the average amount ac-
tually collected was $4,750.99
The practical component of this federalism objection focuses
on the administrative difficulties federal agencies face in complying
with fifty different sets of regulations. Again, given that federal fa-
cilities must follow state standards, adding enforcement to state
powers should not make compliance any harder than it already is.
In fact, when the requirements are state or local, enforcers at the
state level may be better equipped to properly determine viola-
tions and penalties.
One fear is that states will undermine the "worst first" prior-
ity scheme that federal agencies have devised for cleaning up fed-
eral facilities, 100 because agencies will have to take action in the
states that happen to be most aggressively enforcing civil penal-
" Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3734.13(C) and (E) (Anderson, 1988 and Supp 1989). See also
Hearings on Federal Compliance at 25, 214, for documentation of similar programs in Idaho
and Virginia (cited in note 6). Maine, however, is an example of a state where collected
penalties simply go to the state treasury. 38 Me Rev Stat Ann § 349(2) (West 1989 and
Supp 1989).
Hearings on Federal Compliance at 39-41 (letter from National Association of Attor-
neys General (NAAG)) (cited in note 6). In response to a request by the House Subcommit-
tee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials, the NAAG compiled information on envi-
ronmental penalties assessed by fourteen states against federal facilities under state and
federal environmental laws. According to the survey, most penalties were well under
$50,000; the two outlier penalties, $125,000 and $500,000, were at Fernald in Ohio and the
Vandenburg Air Force Base in California, both sites with long histories of egregious viola-
tions. Jonathan Z. Cannon, Acting Assistant Administrator of the Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response at the EPA, also testified before Congress that EPA had no knowledge
of existing state abuse of penalty power. Id at 129.
98 See generally DOE: Pollution at Fernald, Ohio, Hearing on HR 3783, HR 3784, and
HR 3785 before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong, 2d Sess (1988).
99 HR Rep No 101-141 at 40 (cited in note 1). These penalty figures exist because states
calculate RCRA penalties despite the possibility that federal facilities will resist payment.
In some cases, federal facilities will pay an amount agreed to in a settlement, although they
are reluctant to concede that they have paid a penalty. Confirmed in author's telephone
conversation with Van Clay, Ohio Assistant Attorney General (cited in note 74).
100 Hearings on Federal Compliance at 95, 102 (statements by William H. Parker I,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment, and Leo Duffy, Special Assistant to
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ties.1"1 The bulk of RCRA enforcement activity, however, is di-
rected at obtaining compliance with RCRA's cradle-to-grave pre-
ventive measures, such as recordkeeping and proper storage. The
need to set priorities among facilities should not be so urgent for
those relatively inexpensive measures; clean-up activities, in con-
trast, may require so many dollars that immediate concurrent
clean-up is nearly impossible. 102 States do have the authority
under §§ 6924(u) and 6928(h) to seek corrective action, which the-
oretically could include clean-up activities, but the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) is intended to cover most clean-up activities.103
To the extent that interference with agency priorities is a valid
concern, it is not unique to civil penalties; injunctions sought by
states, which are clearly permitted under RCRA, will influence fed-
eral agency behavior in the same way. Two considerations also mit-
igate the severity of this concern. First, penalties may force Con-
gress to appropriate more funds for environmental compliance,
thus eliminating some of the need for ranking compliance activi-
ties. In addition, states with the most aggressive enforcement ef-
forts may well be those with the worst federal facility environmen-
tal problems.
Giving states penalty powers undeniably creates the potential
for some problems, but those problems must be evaluated in the
context of the possible alternatives, not in a vacuum. F-or instance,
unless the EPA is given exclusive enforcement authority, the prob-
lem of state interference with federally set priorities will arise no
matter what the particular enforcement mechanism.1 04 Although a
full discussion of the relative merits of federal versus state enforce-
ment is beyond the scope of this Comment, the fact that alterna-
the Secretary of Energy for Coordination of DOE Environment and Waste Management)
(cited in note 6).
101 HR Rep No 101-141 at 49 (letter from L. Niederlehner, Deputy General Counsel,
Department of Defense) (cited in note 1).
202 Hearings on Federal Compliance at 106-09 (DOE's five-year plan for prioritizing
clean-up), and 127-28 (statement by Leo Duffy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Energy
for Coordination of DOE Environment and Waste Management, explaining that the priori-
tization plan is not necessary for ordinary RCRA compliance measures) (cited in note 6).
103 42 USC §§ 6924(u) and 6928(h). Hearings on Federal Cleanup at 412, 419-21 (state-
ment of J. Winston Porter, Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Re-
sponse, EPA, outlining strategy in cases of RCRA/CERCLA overlap) (cited in note 9). The
proper interaction between the two statutes is a matter of ongoing dispute. See State of
Colorado v United States Department of the Army, 707 F Supp 1562 (D Colo 1989) (hold-
ing that CERCLA does not preempt injunctive relief for RCRA violations).
104 As pointed out in note 10 above, however, federally coordinated enforcement has its
own legal difficulties, and is not currently available.
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tive enforcers will have their own disadvantages and advantages is
worth keeping in mind.
D. Federal Missions
The most powerful objections to immunity waivers are based
on waivers' effects on federal government functions. In dissent in
Lee, Justice Gray voiced fears about allowing the government to be
sued for appropriating land for military purposes. 10 5 Courts have
continued to be reluctant to find waivers of immunity for monetary
penalties because agency funds would have to be spent on penal-
ties or compliance, rather than the agency's primary mission. 06
Opponents of civil penalties warn particularly of the threat to na-
tional security that sanctions against the Department of Defense
(DOD) might create: "Federal agencies exist and are explicitly
funded to perform a function for the public good and cannot sim-
ply go out of business or go bankrupt .... Use of DOD funds to
pay fines and penalties diverts funds from the specific defense
11107mission ....
Civil penalties need not unduly interfere with the undeniably
important functions that DOD and other federal agencies per-
form. 08 The oddest aspect of this concern is that it assumes that
compliance will not occur, and that penalties will have to be paid,
depriving the agency of some of the resources it could have spent
on its mission. The main objective of waiving immunity to penal-
ties is to create a deterrent to agency environmental violations, and
an incentive for Congress to allocate necessary compliance funds,
not to actually collect the fine. To the extent that penalties are
indeed assessed, many of the same safeguards that preserve a bal-
101 Lee, 106 US at 226 (Gray dissenting).
108 The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of penalties against the government in
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v Ault, 256 US 554, 558 (1921). The relevant statute provided
that government railroad operators "shall be subject to all laws and liabilities as common
carriers ... ." However, the Court concluded that "Congress is not to be assumed to have
adopted the method of fines paid out of public funds to insure obedience to the law on the
part of the Government's railway employees." Id at 563-64. The restrictive attitude towards
penalties in Ault has since been applied in the interpretation of other statutes as well. See
Matter of Sparkman, 703 F2d 1097, 1100-01 (9th Cir 1983) and Smith v Russellville Pro-
duction Credit Association, 777 F2d 1544, 1549-50 (11th Cir 1985) (both cases holding fed-
erally-organized credit associations, formed to help small farmers, exempt from punitive
damages); Painter v Tennessee Valley Authority, 476 F2d 943, 944-45 (5th Cir 1973) (TVA
immune from punitive damages).
107 HR Rep No 101-141 at 49 (letter from L. Niederlehner, Deputy General Counsel,
Department of Defense) (cited in note 1).
108 Note that concerns about public missions have not prevented the assessment of pen-
alties against state and local governments. See text at notes 83-84.
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ance between federal and state power-such as the need to main-
tain credibility, penalty formulas, and environmental response
funds-will prevent excessively high penalties.
Civil penalties may interfere with agency missions when they
effectively deter agencies, since this will force agencies to use funds
for environmental compliance. Injunctions, however, create the
same interference by mandating compliance. More importantly,
the use of funds for compliance seems to accord with Congress's
intent in subjecting agencies to environmental standards, and thus
may be an acceptable degree of interference with agency missions.
No matter how important an agency's particular mission might be,
it should not override Congress's intent to protect the environ-
ment. If the amount of resources being diverted seems excessive,
the problem is not the availability of penalties, but the level of
environmental standards that have been set by Congress and the
states. Forcing environmental compliance should also preserve
money for agencies' primary functions in the long run by prevent-
ing cleanup costs. 09 Congress, in fact, seems already to have struck
the balance in favor of environmental compliance by creating a
narrow exemption for federal facilities only when compliance
threatens a "paramount interest of the United States." 10
Paradoxically, civil penalties must interfere to some extent
with a facility's operations if they are to be an effective deterrent.
In discussing the possibility of fining officials, Professor Peter
Schuck suggests a solution to the dilemma: the penalties "must be
both modest in amount (so vigorous decisionmaking is not chilled)
and more or less automatic (so the deterrent is credible).""' This
solution applies as well to agency fines; penalties, if modest, will
permit agencies to fulfill their functions, and will serve as an effec-
101 HR Rep No 101-141 at 7, 10 (statements of Randall Mathis, Acting Director, Arkan-
sas Department of Pollution Control and Technology, Charles M. Oberly H, Attorney Gen-
eral, Delaware, and Larry Morgan, Deputy General Counsel, Florida Department of Envi-
ronmental Regulation) (cited in note 1).
110 42 USC § 6961 (1982). The president has exercised this exemption power only once
so far. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order exempting Fort Allen, in
Puerto Rico, from RCRA, CAA, CWA and Noise Control Act (NCA) requirements based on
a finding that the need to immediately relocate and house Haitian refugees represented a
"paramount interest." Executive Order 12,327, 3 CFR 185 (1981). The statute clarifies the
narrow scope of the "paramount interest" language in the following sentence: "No such ex-
emption shall be granted due to lack of appropriation unless the President shall have specif-
ically requested such appropriation as part of the budgetary process and the Congress shall
have failed to make available such requested appropriation."
112 Schuck, Suing Government at 108 (cited in note 57).
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tive deterrent if their imposition is a predictable consequence of
noncompliance.
CONCLUSION
The current language of RCRA § 6961, both on its face and in
its historical context, supports the conclusion that federal facilities
should be subject to civil penalties for violations of environmental
standards. The use of civil penalties satisfies, or can be tailored to
satisfy, a range of policy concerns, including political legitimacy,
environmental protection, separation of powers, and federal mis-
sions. Making broad enforcement powers available against federal
facilities meshes with the current development of public law. Pub-
lic law rights are particularly dependent on effective remedies be-
cause the costs of compliance are often high while the incentives,
in the absence of individual accountability, are low.11 2 Viewed in
this context, the vigorous application of civil penalties seems not
only sensible but also necessary.
12 Id at 26.
